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Introduction
 
Industrial relations (IR) have been rather extensively investigated in many eastern Euro-
pean countries in the last 15 years, but there is still very limited information about
Romania. This article presents an overview of the main IR institutions, concerning both
the legal framework as well as their operation in practice, in Romania.
 
1
 
 It examines the
role of the state, employers associations, trade unions and collective bargaining from a
historical perspective. In the final part, the changes that have occurred after 1989 in
these selected parameters are discussed in the broader eastern European context.
The study is based on primary data collected in 2000 and 2001 which aimed to
identify what has changed since 1989 regarding the IR actors (i.e. state, employers as-
sociations and trade unions) and the relations between them. Seven officials from
national institutions were interviewed: a government representative involved in the
establishing of the Labour Code; two officials from employers associations; two trade
union officials; the secretary of the Economic and Social Council; and the representa-
tive in Romania of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). An ILO official
responsible for the activities of employers associations throughout central and eastern
European countries was also interviewed. In addition, 25 (one-to-one) interviews
were conducted in a total of fifteen companies which were studied during the re-
search.
 
2
 
 Thirteen interviewees were managers or employers (three employers, three
top managers, three human resource managers and four line managers), while twelve
were employees (four shop stewards, seven employees and an unemployed person).
Hence, data triangulation is used to ensure the reliability of the empirical evidence.
 
The role of the state in industrial relations
 
Historical overview
 
The Romanian state started to play an important role in IR at the beginning of the 20
 
th
 
century (Moarcas, 1999). Following a general strike in 1920, the Law on the Settle-
ment of Collective Labour Disputes was adopted. This obliged the parties in a conflict
to have conciliation and/or arbitration in a tripartite commission comprising repre-
sentatives of workers, employers and the state before a strike could be called. Then, in
1921, the Law on Trade Unions was adopted which recognised both the right of work-
ers to conclude collective agreements and the obligation of the employer to imple-
 
1 This article is based on empirical research conducted during PhD studies financed by Lon-
don South Bank University (UK). I would like to thank my supervisor, Emeritus Professor
Karl Koch, for providing expert advice and tremendous support at all stages of the project.  
2 The sample was not intended to be representative. It included a wide range of firms in
terms of ownership (five state-owned companies and ten private companies), size (six
large and nine medium sized companies) and products (six from the manufacturing sector
and nine from the service sector). 
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ment them (Moarcas, 1999: 242). The first Law on Collective Labour Contracts was
adopted in 1929. It indicated that an individual employment contract must not contain
provisions less favourable to employees than those included in a collective agree-
ment. Therefore, the state has been acting as legislator and mediator, and has been set-
ting down certain minimum standards, since the 1920s.
During the communist regime, the (party-)state was the main actor in labour rela-
tions. The first Labour Code, adopted in 1950, changed the previous legal regulation in
line with the political ideology of the new regime (Burloiu, 1997: 384). A new Labour
Code was adopted in 1973, but it did not bring any significant changes in practice. Em-
ployees, trade unions, top management and the (party-)state were supposed to act in
full harmony to ‘construct socialism’ (Héthy, 1991). Hence, there was no real collec-
tive bargaining and no right to strike. The state established wages and promotion rules
based on qualification and seniority (Pert and Vasile, 1995: 255). The policy of full
employment and wages generally not being related to economic performance led to
overstaffing and low productivity. Wages did not act as price signals in the labour mar-
ket and enterprises could not motivate labour (Héthy, 1991: 136). Furthermore, job se-
curity was guaranteed while labour mobility was discouraged (Pert and Vasile, 1995:
256). Therefore, labour relations were based on the specific ideology of communism.
 
Transition period
 
In December 1989, Romania committed itself to design a pluralist regulatory frame-
work for employment relations. It aimed to create an institutional framework to facili-
tate the development of social dialogue, with the emphasis on co-operation between
trade unions, employers associations and the government (Mihes and Casale, 1999:
271). Initially, political obligations stipulated in the Labour Code were abrogated. In
1991, fundamental labour laws regulating collective bargaining, labour conflicts, mini-
mum wages, wage taxation, working time, trade unions, etc. were passed. Addition-
ally, the Constitution, adopted in 1991, granted the right of every individual to work
and outlawed any discrimination on the ground of sex, nationality, race, religion, poli-
tical opinion, and trade union membership or the lack of it. Hence, freedom of associa-
tion, collective bargaining and the right to strike were formalised since the beginning
of the 1990s.
The centre-right government, which was in power between 1996 and 2000, pro-
moted tripartite dialogue more than had the previous left-wing government. To up-
hold the social dialogue, a number of tripartite institutions were formally established,
such as the Economic and Social Council (CES) (Law No. 109/1997, modified by
Law No. 58/2003), the Tripartite Commission of Social Dialogue (Decision No. 89/
1997), the National Agency for Employment and Vocational Training (Law No. 145/
1998) and the Employment Tribunal. The new tripartite institutions gave legal rights
to trade unions and employers associations to be consulted on economic, social and
labour policies (e.g. via CES) and also with regard to the implementation of legisla-
tion (e.g. the Employment Tribunal). Nevertheless, these newly-created tripartite in-
stitutions lacked experienced staff and their effectiveness in practice was reduced
(OECD, 2000; Rusu, 2002: 31). Hence, legal support has not been sufficient to engen-
Access via CEEOL NL Germany
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der the actual involvement of the social partners in policy-making and implementa-
tion during the transition.
An important institution established in 1991 was the minimum wage. The govern-
ment determines the minimum wage after consultation with the social partners (Pert
and Vasile, 1995: 262) and, after 1993, the minimum wage has been binding on both
private and public companies (Law No. 68/1993). Nevertheless, the minimum wage is
very low. In 1992, it only covered 68% of the requirements of a minimum living
standard (as defined by the Institute of Labour and Social Protection) while by 1995
this had further decreased to 36% (Rusu, 2002: 30). Hence, the minimum wage has a
more symbolic role than something which provides real social protection, but it does
represent the starting point for collective bargaining for the social partners.
After 1989, unemployment has been recognised and unemployment benefits pro-
vided. The legislation entitles the registered unemployed to receive benefit for a maxi-
mum of nine months and to access a support allowance for a further eighteen months
(Lavigne, 1999: 125). In addition, to facilitate the restructuring process, a system of
compensation was introduced after 1991 which entitles employees from restructured
state-owned companies to receive severance payments (Pert and Vasile, 1995). Never-
theless, unemployment benefits are lower than the minimum wage, which is itself far
from covering the requirements of even a minimum living standard. Therefore, unem-
ployment has been a major issue since 1989.
The weak enforcement of the legislation has been another major issue during the
transition period (OECD, 2000). Legislation is not always implemented, not least be-
cause there are frequent legal changes, sometimes producing incoherence. Respond-
ents in this study also revealed that the very high payroll tax
 
3
 
 has led to the develop-
ment of a large informal economy in which workers have no employment contract,
while employers who do pay taxes face unfair competition and have to reduce the cost
of labour. To improve the implementation of employment regulations, the Law on the
Labour Inspectorate was passed in 1999 (No. 130/1999). However, interviewees com-
mented that the low wages of the inspectors and the complex legislation have fre-
quently resulted in the ‘bribing’ of labour inspectors and the ‘selective’ enforcement
of labour legislation. As a result, the informal sector, where employees have no em-
ployment contract and no social benefits, has been on the increase (OECD, 2000).
Labour legislation is still changing in Romania. In 2003, the laws on trade unions
 
4
 
and the CES were modified and a new Labour Code introduced. The Labour Code
adopted in 1973 was still in force in 2003, albeit with certain changes and amend-
ments, the main ones of which consisted of the abrogation of the political duties of
workers,
 
5
 
 the reduction of working time from 48 hours per week to 40 hours (Law
No. 95/1990) and the removal of the obligation on employers to ensure employment
stability (Decision No. 86/1996). A draft of a new Labour Code was elaborated in
2000, but it took more than two years to be adopted because the government sought to
achieve consensus between the trade unions and the employers associations. Besides,
 
3 Operating at about 60% of wages (OECD, 2000).
4 The main change is that the new law allows employees from different companies to estab-
lish a local union. Before 2003, individuals could only join unions from their company.
5 For instance, the obligation of ‘socialist education’ was part of vocational training.
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the external requirements of the European Union (EU) and the ILO appear to have
played an important role in shaping the IR system in Romania. For instance, a team
comprising two Romanian specialists, one specialist from the ILO and one from the
EU drafted the new Labour Code in 2000. In line with the requirements of the EU, the
new draft contains a provision to introduce a type of works council, but neither the
employers associations nor the trade unions wanted a second channel of employee
representation. Finally, in 2003, the social partners agreed that, in companies with
more than twenty employees, where none of them is a union member, employees can
elect representatives for a period of up to two years to monitor the implementation of
employees’ rights and to promote employees’ interests (Labour Code 2003, Art. 224
in 
 
Raporturi de munca
 
 2003: 42). The procedure for the adoption of the new Labour
Code suggests that the labour legislation has been determined by the responses of the
state authorities to external and internal pressures.
In summary, the Romanian state appears to play a similar role in IR to states in
western Europe, but its involvement in IR is much higher. Its main roles are as legis-
lator for employment relations, establisher of minimum labour standards and as the
third party in tripartite bodies. Additionally, the state is an important employer within
the public sector. However, the state continues to intervene strongly in IR, not only
because it has had to establish a new legal framework but also due to the inherited
legacies and its gradualist approach to the transformation process. Therefore, the new
roles during the transition period, along with the communist legacies, have resulted in
an interventionist state as far as IR is concerned.
 
Employers associations
 
Historical overview
 
Overall, there was a very weak development of employers associations until 1989.
Professional associations emerged after 1866 but until the Law on Professional Asso-
ciations was adopted in 1924 (Law No. 21/1924) they included both employers and
employees (Burloiu, 1997: 366). The process of industrialisation was not very ad-
vanced in Romania until 1945, so there were not many private owners to organise. Be-
sides, the Guild Law introduced in 1938, stipulated that the state recognised only one
guild for each professional category, including both employers and employees (Burloiu,
1997: 369). The Guild Law was abrogated in 1940, but there was no reason to develop
employers associations during the royal regime since trade unions were banned. Fur-
thermore, after 1945 there were no employers associations as there were virtually no
private owners. The top managers of the state-owned companies represented their com-
panies in the Chamber of Commerce, but this was a trade association with no role in IR.
Its main functions were to promote and support import-export activities of the compa-
nies, as companies were not allowed to have direct contracts with foreign companies.
Therefore, employers associations were never well consolidated in Romania.
 
Transition period
 
The legislative framework adopted after 1989 supported the emergence of employers
associations. The organisation, functioning and attributes of employers associations
are stipulated by the Constitution of 1991, which warrants the freedom of employers
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to form associations, and by the Law on Employers Associations No. 356/2001. Ac-
cording to this law, employers associations should be constituted from companies
having similar economic activities. It also stipulates that at least fifteen employers (or
companies) are necessary to establish an employers’ association, or at least five mem-
bers in branches where they produce at least 70% of the industrial output. They may
be organised alongside branches, industrial sectors or other divisions, such as regions.
Two or more employers associations can form a federation, while two or more feder-
ations can form a confederation. Furthermore, the Law on Employers associations in-
dicates that employers associations should defend their members’ interest 
 
vis-à-vis
 
 the
state and trade unions, and should promote co-operation and loyal competition between
members. Hence, there is strong statutory intervention in the organisation and functions
of employers associations.
This is further confirmed by employers associations having to meet certain legal
criteria to be entitled to negotiate collective agreements at the national level. To be
representative at the national level, confederations have to include federations of em-
ployers associations from at least 21 counties and 25% of industrial sectors, and cover
a minimum of 7% of the total labour force. To be representative at the sectoral level,
federations should cover at least 10% of the labour force in the appropriate sector.
Employers associations are generally interested in becoming representative, as this al-
lows them to participate in the tripartite bodies and increases their legitimacy.
There were twelve representative confederations in 2003 (see Table 1):
• the General Union of Romanian Industrialists – 1903 (
 
Uniunea Generala a Indus-
triasilor din România 1903
 
, UGIR 1903)
• the Employers Confederation of Romanian Industry (
 
Confedera
 
ţ
 
ia Patronala din
Industria României
 
, CONPIROM)
• the National Council of Romanian Employers (
 
Consiliul Na
 
ţ
 
ional al Patronatului
Român
 
, CoNPR)
• the National Council of Romanian Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (
 
Consil-
iul National al Întreprinderilor Private Mici si Mijlocii din România
 
, 
 
CNIPMMR
 
)
• the General Union of Romanian Industrialists (
 
Uniunea Generala a Industriasilor
din România
 
, UGIR)
• the National Union of Romanian Employers (
 
Uniunea Na
 
ţ
 
ionala a Patronatului
Român
 
, UNPR)
• the National Confederation of Romanian Employers (
 
Confedera
 
ţ
 
ia Na
 
ţ
 
ionala a
Patronatului Român, 
 
CNPR)
• Romanian National Employers (
 
Patronatul Na
 
ţ
 
ional Român,
 
 PNR)
• the National Union of Romanian Employers with Private Capital, recently re-
named Romanian Employers (
 
Uniunea Na
 
ţ
 
ionala a Patronatelor cu Capital Pri-
vat din România – Patronatul Roman
 
, UNPCPR – PR
 
6
 
)
• the VITAL Confederation (
 
Confedera
 
ţ
 
ia VITAL
 
)
 
6 In particular, not to be confused with 
 
Patronatul Roman
 
, the ill-fated confederation referred
to later in the text. As can be seen, many of the Romanian employers associations contain
‘Patronatul Roman’ in their name as ‘patronat’ translates as ‘employers association’.
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• the Romanian Association of Building Entrepreneurs (
 
Asocia
 
ţ
 
ia Româna a Antre-
prenorilor de Construc
 
ţ
 
ii,
 
 
 
ARACO
 
)
• the Employers Confederation of Romania (
 
Confedera
 
ţ
 
ia Patronatelor din Româ-
nia, 
 
CPR).
As Table 1 shows, employers associations are very fragmented. Many confedera-
tions compete for members, as they have members in similar sectors. Few of them
have international affiliations. Representative confederations have the legal right to
participate in the national tripartite body, CES, and to negotiate the national (trans-
sectoral) collective agreement. The number of representative employers confedera-
tions increased from five in 2001 to twelve in 2003. Nevertheless, only eight of them
are members of CES (see Table 1) and only seven participated in the negotiation of
the collective agreement in 2003. Despite formal recognition, the representativeness
of certain employers associations is contested by others.
 
7
 
 Hence, there was an in-
crease in the fragmentation of employers associations between 2001 and 2003.
A first attempt to merge the five largest confederations was made in December
1995 with support from the International Organisation of Employers (Mihes and
Casale, 1999: 277). They signed an agreement to form ‘
 
Patronatul Roman’
 
, but con-
frontations between the divergent interests of private and state-owned enterprises led
to a split in the National Confederation of Romanian Employers in 1996. Further-
more, in 1997 officials of Patronatul Roman were investigated for corruption (Mihes
and Casale 1999: 277). They were not found guilty, but the legitimacy of the organi-
sation declined. Following strong tensions between the members of Patronatul Ro-
man, the confederation split up.
In March 2004, eight of the twelve nationally representative employers organisa-
tions merged into two new organisations (Preda, 2004). The Alliance of Employers
Confederations of Romania (ACPR) brings together two of these organisations, while
the other six have created the Union of Romanian Employers (UPR). The ACPR in-
cludes the CNPR, CONPIROM and four other organisations that were not nationally
representative. Its officials claim that ACPR covers employers that account for 60% of
Romanian gross domestic product (GDP) (Preda, 2004). However, the UPR, incorporat-
ing UGIR, UGIR 1903, UNPCPR–PR, PNR, CoNPR and CNIPMMR (see Table 1 for
details), covering primarily small and medium-sized enterprises, claims that their
members produce around two-thirds of the GDP. Their claims cannot be realistic, but it
is likely that both organisations have a similar coverage, accounting for less than 50% of
GDP, since not all employers associations are covered by the two newly-established or-
ganisations and there are many employers that are not organised. The two mergers indi-
cate that employers have started to gather their forces in order to be able to provide an
articulated view to government and trade unions.
The development of employers federations at industry and sub-sectoral levels is
generally very weak (Ciutacu et al, 2001: 12). It appears that it had not been necessary
 
7 Empirical research conducted for this study.
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for private owners to organise in employers associations because they had generally
enough power to negotiate or impose the desired terms and conditions of employment
via single employer bargaining at enterprise level.
 
8
 
 In the public sector, management of-
ten joined company trade unions to lobby the government or ministries for specific ‘fa-
vours’ (e.g. subsidies), being in competition with other companies. Hence, the ambigu-
ous context of the transition hardly provided any incentives for employers to organise.
Initially, the managers of state-owned enterprises established employers associa-
tions to protect their interests 
 
vis-à-vis 
 
trade unions and the state. However, given that
the state was the real employer, it strongly intervened in the activities of the employ-
ers associations (Mihes and Casale, 1999: 275). Furthermore, in their dialogue with
trade unions they used to justify the inefficient activities of companies by blaming the
incoherent policy of the government. As a result, trade unions preferred to discuss
directly with the government when they had any demands (Mihes and Casale, 1999:
276). Also, the lack of employers associations during the communist era, and the very
limited development before 1945, are other important factors that induced the weak
development after 1989.
 
Research findings
 
Empirical evidence produced for this study revealed that Romanian employers associa-
tions have had no significant role in the development of IR since 1989. Respondents
indicated that the lack of experience and the slow pace of privatisation were the main
factors which led to the very weak development of employers associations. Employ-
ers considered that employers associations could be useful, but that they needed time
to ‘grow up’. Trade union officials indicated that they would prefer to deal with
stronger employers associations which had a mandate to negotiate collective agree-
ments at national and sectoral levels. According to employers associations officials,
there have been some positive developments. Employers associations have negotiated
a number of collective agreements, they are a part of the tripartite bodies and they
have a lobbying function towards the government. Additionally, employers associa-
tions facilitate trade relationships between members and provide them with legal ad-
vice. Therefore, despite their weak development, employers associations have started
to engage with IR issues.
At company level, respondents indicated that the relationship between employers
and/or top managers and employees had not, by and large, changed much since 1989.
In particular, there is still a top-down decision-making process, not only because em-
ployers and managers preferred to impose unilateral decisions but also because em-
ployees await orders and lack initiative. Thus, the findings suggest a large degree of
continuity in the autocratic management style.
Evidence revealed that human resources departments have emerged in some
Romanian enterprises after 1996, but that the management of human resources is fre-
quently poor. According to respondents, the recruitment of personnel is based more
 
8 Empirical research conducted for this study.
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on nepotism than on competence. Furthermore, top managers rarely promote middle
managers, as they fear that middle managers may take their positions. Nevertheless,
in multinationals and in certain national private companies, human resource manage-
ment seems to be done more professionally and competent employees are rewarded
with higher wages and promotion. Human resource managers revealed that it is very
difficult to have a human resource strategy, in the unstable context of the transition. In
state-owned enterprises, managers indicated that they did not know if the company
would be privatised or closed down, and hence it was impossible to develop a long-
term strategy. The findings therefore indicate a trend towards more professional
human resource management only in the private sector.
Summing up, like in other central and eastern European countries, Romanian em-
ployers associations are less developed than the trade unions. The slow privatisation
process and very high degree of state intervention in IR has made them among the
weakest in Eastern Europe. However, at enterprise level, employers and top managers
generally have a much stronger position than unions. It appears that this is a main rea-
son why employers have not needed to associate and to develop stronger employers
associations. Furthermore, the shadow economy, and the illegal practices of many
employers or top managers in state-owned enterprises, has led to an unwillingness to
associate (Mihes and Casale, 1999). Following legislation passed in 2001, employers
associations have started to restructure in line with the new legal requirements but
their transformation remains very slow.
 
Trade unions
 
Historical overview
 
The trade union movement started to develop in Romania at the end of the 19
 
th
 
 century.
The first legal right to form professional associations was laid down in the Constitution
of 1866, but this included both employers and employees (Burloiu, 1997: 366). These
associations were transformed into trade unions in 1872, when the General Association
of Workers in Romania was founded (Moarcas, 1999: 201). In 1883, unions established
the Social Democratic Party, which had an important role in expanding their member-
ship.
 
9
 
 However, subsequent to a general strike in 1920, the government outlawed trade
unions (Moarcas, 1999: 202). The interdiction did not last long as the Law on Trade Un-
ions was adopted the following year (Law No. 41/1921). This provided legal recogni-
tion of the unions and the right to negotiate collective agreements. This law was
abrogated in 1938 (when the royal dictatorship was established) and unions were
banned until 1944 (Burloiu, 1997: 369). Hence, there was a weak development of the
trade union movement until 1945 because the legislation hindered their organisation, as
well as the industrial labour force being small (Nelson, 1986: 108-109).
During the communist regime, trade unions covered almost the entire industrial
labour force. In 1944, the Central Commission for the Organisation of the United La-
 
9 It increased from around 8 470 members in 1907 to 90 000 members in 1920 (Centrul de
resurse pentru sindicate, 2000).
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bour Movement from Romania was created. It established that a trade union should be
constituted in each organisation. Additionally, in enterprises with more than fifty em-
ployees, an enterprise committee should be established. These developments were in-
cluded in the Law on Trade Unions, adopted in 1945 (No. 52/1945). The law guaran-
teed the freedom to join (or not) a trade union but, in practice, employees were
indirectly obliged to join to get certain benefits (e.g. housing). Also, those who did
not join could be considered as being against the communist regime. As a result, trade
union membership increased from 30% in 1945 (519 000 members) to 89% of the in-
dustrial labour force in 1954, reaching almost 100% after 1969 (Nelson, 1986: 108).
A single confederation covering all unions was created in 1966, named the General
Trade Union Confederation of Romania. It represented the hierarchy through which the
party exerted its control over industrial labour (Nelson, 1986).
The role of trade unions was strongly influenced by the ideological belief that
there were no divergent interests between the state, management and employees
(Héthy, 1991: 125; Rusu, 2002: 23). The trade union leadership was part of the party
apparatus in Romania (Nelson, 1986: 108), so their main role was to strengthen the
supremacy of the party and to ensure that their members obeyed the party’s rules.
This role of unions, as an instrument in the implementation of Communist Party poli-
cies, and having no distinct identity, authority or legitimacy deriving from their mem-
bers, is often referred as the political ‘transmission belt’ function (Pravda and Ruble,
1986; Héthy, 1991; Rusu, 2002). In addition, the unions ensured the fulfilment of the
central plan at company level and administered in-company social services and wel-
fare institutions, providing cheap holidays, housing and running cultural and sports
centres (Ockenga, 1997: 314). Trade unions also dealt with complaints and other indi-
vidual issues arising in the workplace, but they did not negotiate collective agree-
ments and they had no right to strike (Nelson, 1986: 113). However, there were few
strikes during the communist regime; those which did occur were vigorously sup-
pressed and led to more severe control by the security forces at the enterprise level.
 
10
 
Therefore, Romanian workers had no autonomous voice before 1989.
 
Transition period
 
These communist legacies resulted in a low legitimacy for the unions in 1989 and a
lack of experience as autonomous institutions. Unions had neither collective bargain-
ing practice, nor knowledge in fighting for membership and organising, nor partici-
pating in democratic elections. Therefore, the post-communist trade unions had to
create new identities and to learn new functions, as the central communist union lost
its 
 
raison d’être 
 
with the collapse of the communist regime.
After 1989, the organisation, functioning and attributes of the trade unions were
regulated primarily by the Constitution of 1991 (which warrants freedom of associa-
tion), the Labour Code and the Law on Trade Unions (Law No. 54/1991). Based on
 
10 Miners strikes took place in 1977 and in 1981 in the Jiu Valley and in September 1983 in
Maramure
 
ș
 
 (Nelson, 1986). Also, workers from the Red Star Tractor plant in Bra
 
ș
 
ov
struck for higher wages in 1987.
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these legal provisions, unions should be independent, professional organisations (con-
stituted from employees working in the same workplace or based on their profession)
aiming to defend and promote the professional, social and economic interests of their
members, but not their political interests. However, there have been many strikes for
political purposes (e.g. miners strikes during the 1990s), arguably supported by the
government in power (Croucher, 1998: 27). Therefore, the legal provisions have not
necessarily been implemented in practice.
Generally, unions represent employees in collective bargaining. The Law on Collec-
tive Labour Agreements (No. 130/1996) gives representative trade unions the right to
negotiate collective agreements at national, sectoral (or branch) and company levels.
To be representative, trade unions need to have legal status and fulfil a minimal mem-
bership condition:
• at the national level, the total number of trade union members must be equivalent
to at least five per cent of the entire labour force
• at the sectoral level, a seven per cent membership of the labour force in that par-
ticular sector 
• at company level, at least one-third of employees should be members.
If there is no (representative) trade union in a company, employees have the legal
right to elect (by secret ballot) representatives to negotiate a collective agreement.
The right to strike, stipulated in the Law on Collective Labour Disputes, backs up col-
lective bargaining. However, the legislation requires a complex procedure before a
strike can be called, including written notice to the Ministry of Labour and Social Pro-
tection (Trif and Narosi, 2001: 20-21). Additionally, this law gives union officials the
right to represent employees during collective or individual conflicts 
 
vis-à-vis
 
 em-
ployers and in the Court of Justice. In summary, the legislation supports trade unions,
but it strongly intervenes by regulating their procedural rules and functions.
The legislation also regulates the internal structure of unions. Under the terms of
the Law on Trade Unions, each union organisation has to be registered with a court in
order to acquire legal status. However, the procedure is not very complex and all
workers have the right to join (or not) a trade union. The law allows a minimum fif-
teen employees to form a union; two unions from the same industry can form a union
federation if they jointly have at least sixty members; and two federations can form a
confederation. Despite a certain vertical integration, this legal framework has led to a
decentralised and fragmented trade union movement (Mihes and Casale, 1999: 274).
Nevertheless, the pluralist structure of trade unions may also be an (exaggerated) re-
action to the unique trade union structure operating during the communist regime.
At the top level, there are more than twenty national confederations (Mihes and
Casale 1999: 274), but only five of them met the representativeness criteria in 2003
(see Table 2).
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Table 2 – Nationally representative trade union confederations, 2003
 
Sources:compiled from Preda (2003) and Rusu (2002).
ETUC – the European Trade Union Confederation   ICFTU – the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions    WCL – the World Confederation of Labour
 

 
the National Free Trade Union Confederation of Romania –
 
 
 
Fra
 
ţia (CNSLR-
Fraţia) is the largest confederation, covering 33.7% of the total of around two mil-
lion trade union members.11 It was created in 1993 through a merger of the
reformed official union (CNSLR) and a new union (Fraţia), both confederations
initially established in 1990. It includes 48 federations from various industrial sec-
tors and services (e.g. petroleum and telecoms)
• the National Trade Union Block (BNS) was created in 1991 and represents 20.6%
of all trade union members. It includes 39 union federations representing mainly
the machine-building industry, the chemical and oil industry, arts and culture, and
transportation
• the National Democratic Trade Union Confederation of Romania (CSDR) was
created in 1994 as result of a split from CNSLR-Fraţia and comprises 16.5% of
total union membership. It includes 22 federations being mainly represented in the
education, health and food sectors
• the National Trade Union Confederation Cartel Alfa (CNS-Cartel Alfa) was cre-
ated in 1990 and represents 16.4% of trade union members. It comprises 29 feder-
ations and is represented in various sectors of industry (e.g. steel and mining),
services and agriculture
Organisation Year of  
establishment
No. of  
members
Membership  
base (the main  
sectors)
Political  
orientation
International  
affiliation
CNSLR-Fraţia 1990 800 000 Relatively  
balanced in all  
sectors
Social 
democrat
ETUC and 
ICFTU
BNS 1991 375 000 Automotive,  
chemical and  
transport 
industries
Social 
democrat
ETUC and 
ICFTU
CSDR 1994 345 000 Education, food 
industry, 
cement  and 
textiles
Christian  
democrat
ETUC and 
WCL
Cartel Alfa 1990 325 000 Steel and min-
ing  industries
Christian  
democrat
ETUC and 
WCL
Meridian 1994 170 000 Mining, steel 
and  chemical 
sectors
Independent None
11 The reliability of data may be questionable. Data is provided by the Centre for Trade Un-
ion Resources (Centrul de resurse pentru sindicate), based on a survey conducted by a
tripartite body in 2000. Other authors, such as Croucher (1998: 26) and Rusu (2002: 25)
indicate higher membership figures, but they also question the reliability of the data.
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• the Meridian was created in 1994 and covers 8.9% of all trade union members. It
includes 27 federations and is represented mainly in the steel, mining, oil and
chemicals industries.
The main goal of all the confederations is to defend and promote the professional,
economic and social aims of their members. Their main influence since 1989 has been
in the creation of new labour legislation. Table 2 shows that Romanian trade union
confederations are affiliated to the ETUC (CNSLR-Fraţia, BNS, CSDR and Cartel
Alfa), the ICFTU (CNSLR-Fraţia and BNS) and the WCL (Cartel Alfa and CSDR).
Despite the legal provisions that unions should not be involved in politics, three
confederations have political affiliations. CNSLR-Fraţia and BNS support the Social
Democrat Party (in power since 2000) while CSDR supports the Christian-Democrats
(Rusu, 2002: 26). Initially, BNS had a liberal ideology promoting ‘shock-therapy’ but
it has supported the left-wing party since 2000. As a result of this political affiliation
BNS representatives gained two seats in parliament, beside the three members of par-
liament coming from CNSLR-Fraţia. The leader of CSDR was appointed Prime Minis-
ter between 1996-1998, when a coalition including the Christian-Democrats was in
power. Rusu (2002: 26) argues that it appears the ideological split between the Roma-
nian confederations is based on the pragmatic interests of the confederations’ leader-
ships and is not an expression of union members’ ideology. Furthermore, these devel-
opments indicate that trade union confederations are strongly involved in politics.
Trade unions are not subordinated to the political parties but there is still no clear
boundary between the trade union movement and the political parties.
Apart from the legislation, the confederations have been involved in establishing
minimum terms and conditions of employment via the tripartite bodies and collective
bargaining at the national level (Moarcas, 1999). They also provide legal assistance to
their members and support the federations in collective bargaining if they require.
However, the minimum labour standards are very low and the legal framework often
not implemented, so the benefits for employees at the company level are not always
visible. Certain functions of the confederations are thus similar to those from devel-
oped countries, such as lobbying government or providing legal assistance to mem-
bers, but they are much more involved in politics than their counterparts in western
Europe, which appears to be a continuation of the pre-1989 legacies.
The trade union federations are generally not well-consolidated. Federations are
constituted from company trade unions from the same industry. Just two company un-
ions are legally required to form a federation, so they are fragmented and competing
(Mihes and Casale, 1999; Rusu, 2002). Additionally, the financial resources available
to union federations are very limited. For instance, in the construction sector less than
20% of membership dues goes to the federations and confederations while 80%
remains with the company unions (which collect the membership fees) (European In-
stitute for Construction Labour Research 2002: 6). Federations generally deal with
industry-specific labour legislation, collective bargaining and professional training. In
1998, twelve industrial sectors were covered by collective agreements, comprising
42.6% of the total labour force.12 Furthermore, the collective agreements concluded at
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the sectoral level establish only the minimum set of terms and conditions in the re-
spective sector, which are often similar to those concluded at the trans-sectoral
level.13 Therefore, company unions have to negotiate the employment conditions
which are effective at the enterprise level.
Company unions are constituted from employees working in the same enterprise or
in the same workplace.14 One or more unions may operate in the same enterprise, but
only those covering more than 30% of the labour force have the right to negotiate col-
lective agreements.  Apart from concluding and monitoring the implementation of col-
lective agreements, company unions deal with individual issues for their members, de-
pending on their own statutes and resources (Moarcas, 1999). Their financial resources
come primarily from their membership fees, which are generally around 1% of salary.15
Research findings
The empirical findings revealed that there are many problems with the company trade
unions. According to a federation official interviewed, only around one-third of com-
pany union officials really try to protect employees’ interests since most officials are
paid by the company. Company union officials indicated that it is very difficult to de-
velop a professional union team at company level because the management offers
managerial positions to the best unionists with very attractive conditions. If they
refuse the job or continue to support employees’ interests, the management finds a
reason to dismiss them. Furthermore, union officials revealed that the negotiation of
the company collective agreement is very difficult, because wage increases are gene-
rally agreed only in exchange for the dismissal of a number of employees. Therefore,
company unions are frequently in a weak negotiating position.
In addition, there are several other factors that lead to an ineffective representation
of employees’ interests by trade unions. Externally, the economic recession and com-
pany restructuring (including a massive reduction in personnel) has led to a decrease
in trade union power (Rusu, 2002; Clarke et al, 2003). Internally, confederations, fed-
erations and company unions have distinctive statutes so there is often a very compli-
cated decision-making process in union hierarchies, inefficient use of financial re-
sources and inadequate promotion of workers’ interests.16 Moreover, there is a lack of
trust and communication within trade union hierarchies. My interviewees and other
studies (Rusu, 2002; Clarke et al, 2003) indicated that, at the company level, many
union officials are still ‘tools of management’ while, at higher levels, trade union
12 Compiled from Stefanescu, 1999: 528-530; and Codul Muncii 1999: 127-128.
13 See the Collective Agreement 1999/2000  (in Codul Muncii 1999) and the collective
agreement 2001-2005 in the chemical sector (in Contractul colectiv de munca – Ramura
chimie si petrochimie 2001-2005, 2001).
14 Formally, company unions should be independent of the management, hence different
from ‘yellow unions’, but, in practice, they are frequently co-opted by the management,
as will be shown in the next section.
15 Empirical research conducted for this study.
16 Empirical research conducted for this study.
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leaders use union (con)federations as a springboard to achieve their personal (politi-
cal) interests. Certain inherited legacies of trade unions from the communist period
thus seem to have continued after 1989.
The low effectiveness of trade unions, along with the structural changes, led to a
massive reduction in trade union members during the 1990s. Trade union membership
decreased from around 90% of the total industrial labour force in 1991 to 77% in
1995 and to 58% in 2000 (Centrul de resurse pentru sindicate, 2000). Another source
indicates that trade union density in 2002 was 40-46% of the labour force (Clarke et
al, 2003). It is not clear how reliable these union membership data are, but there was
certainly a huge decline in membership during the decade. The reasons for the decline
are partly due to the specific circumstances of the transition period, such as the emer-
gence of private small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with virtually no trade
union representation, the restructuring of all sectors that had over-employment and
the closure of many large enterprises. Additionally, as in developed countries, there
has been a decrease in the manufacturing sector and an expansion of employment in
services and sectors where unions are not well represented. Despite the decline in
trade union membership during the 1990s, Romanian unions still have higher mem-
bership than in many other central and east European countries.
The findings revealed that, by and large, unions have supported the transformation
process and that they have developed an important influence in promoting a pluralist
mechanism for establishing terms and conditions of employment at all levels. Inter-
viewees indicated that unions generally do not hinder restructuring and privatisation,
although they are often against the reduction of personnel. Nevertheless, interviews
revealed that only rarely are trade unions consulted about the restructuring process.
Also, in the five privatised companies investigated during the study, trade unions
were not consulted with regard to the privatisation process. However, respondents
mentioned that, in certain companies that have a monopolistic position in the market,
such as Tractorul Brașov (which primarily produces tractors) trade unions joined
management in stopping the privatisation process. Hence, the findings suggest that, in
many companies, unions are not involved in the restructuring process whereas in cer-
tain large companies they have collaborated with the management to obstruct the pri-
vatisation process.
Summing up, the transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market-based
economy has been a very difficult period for trade unions. They have had to protect
workers’ interests during the transition while supporting the change towards a more
efficient economic system that would (hopefully) improve workers’ conditions in the
long-term. By and large, unions have not obstructed the transformation process, even
though restructuring has led to a massive decline in trade union membership. Roma-
nian trade unions, similar to those from other central and east European countries
(Gabor, 2000: 13), have faced problems of survival and legitimisation since 1989, but
it is true that they have focused more on the political field than on workplace repre-
sentation. Unions have participated in national public policy formulation via the tri-
partite bodies or individual positions in the government, although their political par-
ticipation has only partially resolved the problem of survival and it has not resolved
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the problems of internal legitimisation. The Romanian unions have had an important
influence in shaping the new labour legislation, but the poor state of the economy,
high unemployment and unions’ inherited legacies have resulted in a decentralised
and fragmented trade union movement, with weak influence at the company level and
a low protection of employees’ interests in general.
Collective bargaining
Historical overview
Collective bargaining emerged at the beginning of the 20th century in Romania, but
was without legal support until 1920, when the Law on Collective Labour Disputes
was adopted. This law recognised the right of trade unions to conclude collective
agreements and required conciliation and arbitration by state representatives if no
agreement was achieved between trade unions and employers. More than two hun-
dred collective agreements were signed every year during the 1920s but about two-
thirds were concluded via the arbitration procedure (Moarcas, 1999: 242); voluntary
agreements between trade unions and employers were rarely concluded.
To support voluntary collective bargaining, a Law on Collective Labour Contracts
was introduced in 1929. This stipulated that the collective agreement should be settled
through collective bargaining between employers and/or their representatives and
trade unions. Nevertheless, collective agreements were generally concluded only after
industrial action took place (Moarcas, 1999). These agreements usually regulated
wages, hours of work and holidays (Moarcas 1999: 242). Additionally, they included
a number of procedural rules, such as the conditions of implementation; duration and
renewal procedures; recruitment; career development; and grievance and disciplinary
procedures (Moarcas, 1999). However, the labour legislation adopted in 1941 largely
annihilated the possibility of concluding voluntary collective agreements, because it
introduced obligatory arbitration in the case of industrial conflict. Therefore, employ-
ers and trade unions had little experience of concluding voluntary collective agree-
ments even before the communist period.
During the communist period, trade unions had the legal right to negotiate collec-
tive agreements, but no right to strike. The Labour Code of 1950 stipulated that a
company collective agreement (covering all employees), should be concluded be-
tween a trade union committee and the organisation. This agreement was required to
establish the responsibilities of the parties to fulfil the plan and to improve working
conditions for employees. The Labour Code of 1973 introduced collective bargaining
at sectoral (or branch) level in addition to that at company level. Sectoral agreements
were concluded between the specialised ministry and the trade union federation from
that particular sector. It covered all employees in the sector, but the main task was
very similar to that which applied at the local level, namely to establish the responsi-
bilities of the parties to fulfil the plan. According to expert commentators, it was
obligatory to conclude collective agreements although the actual role of collective
bargaining was insignificant until 1989 (Burloiu, 1997; Moarcas, 1999; Stefanescu,
1999). In summary, voluntary collective bargaining was never well-established in Ro-
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mania and such an inherited legacy had an important influence on the development of
collective bargaining after 1989.
Transition period
The pluralist legislation adopted after 1989 entitled the social partners to bargain col-
lectively and gave unions the right to strike. The process of collective bargaining is
primarily regulated by the Law on Collective Labour Contracts,17 which stipulates
that collective agreements may be concluded at national, industry (or other sub-divi-
sion) and at company levels. Specific to the Romanian legislation is that this law
requires employers (or top managers) to initiate collective bargaining annually within
any company with more than 21 employees. The legislation indicates that all employ-
ees in a bargaining unit should be covered by the appropriate collective agreement but
it only allows a collective agreement to be concluded in a specific company, sector or
trans-sector. It also specifies the representativeness criteria for the trade unions and
employers associations at each level (as indicated previously). Thus, the legislation
may support collective bargaining but there is a continuation of certain inherited com-
munist legacies, such as a single collective agreement covering all employees.
The persistence of pre-1989 practices is also indicated by other statutory require-
ments. Firstly, each collective agreement has to be in a written form and registered
with a state agency, which shows the perpetuation of the bureaucratic system. Sec-
ondly, the legislation specifies a minimal content for the negotiations. It stipulates
that each collective agreement should cover at least the issues of wages, working con-
ditions, working hours and holidays (Law No. 143/1997). In addition, it indicates that
the provisions included in agreements at lower levels have to be similar, or more fa-
vourable, for employees than those agreed at higher levels. In practice, this makes
collective agreements concluded at the national and the sectoral levels only minimal
frameworks for the negotiation of collective agreements at the company level (Mihes
and Casale, 1999). Consequently, collective bargaining is generally decentralised.
Nevertheless, the existing legislation indicates that state intervention in collective bar-
gaining is still very strong, primarily due to the inherited legacies.
Research findings
Empirical findings suggest that collective bargaining has become an important mecha-
nism through which terms and conditions of employment are established. Respondents
indicated that, generally, wages, social benefits, holidays and working conditions are
negotiated between trade unions and employers and, sometimes, the state. Neverthe-
less, interviewees revealed that, in some companies, the employer imposes the em-
ployment contract unilaterally. According to the respondents, individual bargaining
takes place formally in most companies, but employees generally just sign the contract
established by the management. Essentially, there has been a change in the mechanism
for establishing terms and conditions of employment after 1989 away from statutory
17 No.13/1991, amended by Law No. 130/1996 and Law No. 143/1997.
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legislation towards collective and individual bargaining, or where terms and conditions
are established by the employer.
Respondents revealed a large number of issues related to collective bargaining.
Firstly, trade union officials indicated that it is very difficult to obtain genuine finan-
cial information from employers. Also, they indicated that, in companies which have
financial problems, they have to re-negotiate the minimum agreed at higher levels be-
cause employers cannot afford to implement such provisions (although this is illegal).
Secondly, employees indicated that many company unions are (still) subordinated to
the management, while collective bargaining is just a means to give legitimacy to
both parties. Additionally, respondents revealed that SME employers generally do not
accept any kind of bargaining with their employees. Thirdly, employers indicated
that, due to the lack of financial discipline (e.g. many companies do not pay payroll
taxes), they have to minimise labour costs in order to survive. These findings suggest
that the ambiguous transition context, along with the inherited legacies, has led to an
ineffective collective bargaining mechanism.
Summing up, after 1989, the mechanism for establishing terms and conditions of
employment changed from statutory legislation to collective bargaining. The main
type of collective bargaining is single employer bargaining at the enterprise level, but
there is multi-employer bargaining at national and sectoral levels. Hence, collective
bargaining is decentralised, but there is a degree of co-ordination regarding the mini-
mum terms and conditions of employment. Nevertheless, there is strong state inter-
vention in the collective bargaining mechanism, probably because voluntary collec-
tive bargaining was never well-consolidated in Romania. Despite the establishment of
a collective bargaining mechanism after 1989, its effectiveness in practice has been
reduced due to inherited legacies, the economic recession and the increase in the in-
formal sector since 1989.
Conclusion
In the years following 1989, there has been a fundamental change in IR in Romania,
from a monopolist to a pluralist approach to IR. The emerging system of IR has new
institutions, such as trade unions, employers associations and a collective bargaining
mechanism, but the old attitudes of the actors still have an important influence on IR.
The study’s findings are by and large, in line with empirical studies in other central and
east European countries, which suggest that the process of transformation in eastern
Europe has not been straightforward and that the economic and political heritage and
the enterprise-specific legacies from the communist period are important (Vickerstaff
et al, 1998; Pollert, 1999; Martin, 1999; Vickerstaff et al, 2000). Both empirical find-
ings and legislative changes indicate that IR in Romania is in the full process of
change, with new and old elements operating side-by-side.
Evidence reveals that the state has a strong influence in IR as legislator and as em-
ployer, substantiating other studies elsewhere in central and eastern Europe (Martin,
1997; Vickerstaff and Thirkell, 1997; Pollert, 2000). Findings suggests that the role of
the state in IR is more extensive in countries such as Romania, where the overall tran-
sition towards a market-based economy is less advanced. Nevertheless, the unstable
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and unpredictable environment, with immature and inexperienced social actors, has
resulted in higher state intervention in IR throughout central and eastern Europe com-
pared to western Europe.
As regards employers associations, the findings substantiate the statement of an ILO
official interviewed in 2000, who indicated that employers associations in central and
east European countries are very weak, with the Romanian ones among the weakest.
The heterogeneity of employers, particularly in the newly-emerged private sector which
often operates somewhere between the formal and the informal sectors, makes it very
difficult for employers to agree on a common bargaining position (Lecher and Opten-
hogel, 1995: 403; Tóth, 1997: 341). Employers are generally reluctant to delegate au-
thority to employers associations because they have sufficient power to decide the terms
and conditions of employment at the company level. It appears that the slow pace of pri-
vatisation in Romania has resulted in higher state intervention in the activities of em-
ployers associations than in other central and east European countries. Nevertheless, it is
very difficult to evaluate the development of employers associations across central and
eastern Europe due to the very limited empirical evidence.
The key changes in the trade union role and structure concern the emergence of a
pluralist, more or less independent trade union organisations with voluntary member-
ship and a decentralised organisational structure. After 1989, trade unions had a major
role in establishing the labour legislation, they developed a collective bargaining
function backed up by the right to strike and have generally supported the restructur-
ing process. Even so, Romanian trade unions have many features of the communist
type, such as being co-opted by the management. Furthermore, the trade union feder-
ations are a rather loose umbrella of company unions, indicating a weaker develop-
ment of union federations in central and east European countries compared to western
Europe. In certain countries in central and eastern Europe, such as Romania, trade un-
ion density is higher than the average in western European countries, even though the
institutional development of trade unionism is much poorer. Nevertheless, the evi-
dence in Romania is that, of the three IR actors, trade unions are better developed and
closer to those functioning in western Europe than are employers associations or the
state, substantiating other studies in central and east Europe.
It appears that the lack of experience with voluntary collective bargaining, the pre-
vious unitarist culture and the ambiguous context of the transition has resulted in a
very limited effectiveness of collective bargaining in most central and eastern Euro-
pean countries. Evidence in Romania indicates that the minimal frameworks agreed at
national and sectoral levels, along with the decentralised system of collective bargain-
ing, has rarely resulted in a positive outcome for the three IR actors. For the state, col-
lective agreements do not ensure an increase in efficiency, as companies with poor
performance (which do not implement even the minimal terms and conditions of em-
ployment) are neither forced by the state nor by trade unions to go out of business. For
employers, it does not always result in a profitable business, although it is possible
that it contributes to conflict resolution. For employees, collective bargaining has
given them a voice in establishing terms and conditions of employment, but they have
generally low wages and high job insecurity. Nevertheless, employees’ situation may
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be even worse without collective bargaining and trade union representation. There-
fore, the empirical findings substantiate previous studies (e.g. Draus, 2002; Lado,
2002) in indicating that the effectiveness of collective bargaining in most central and
east European countries is very limited compared to western Europe.
After 45 years during which the party-state determined almost all aspects of em-
ployment relations, the strategic choice in Romania, as in all central and east Euro-
pean countries, was to adopt a pluralist legislative framework in which the social part-
ners were guaranteed voluntary association and the right to bargain collectively,
backed up by the right to strike. However, these findings reveal that the emerging in-
stitutions have retained certain features from the pre-1989 period. In contrast to west-
ern Europe, the evidence indicates that state intervention in IR has remained very
high, that employers associations are usually very weak and that trade unions have
continued to be company-based, as well as strongly involved in politics at the national
level. Also, within the precarious transition context of economic recession and in-
creasing unemployment, the effectiveness of labour institutions has generally been
very limited, particularly for employees. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that there is
great variety in IR institutions across and within central and east European countries.
Overall, the collapse of the communist regime led to the adoption of the major IR in-
stitutions operating in western Europe (not least because this was a precondition of
joining the EU) but, as the Romanian example indicates, there is a considerable de-
gree of continuity in their structures and functions.
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